Yes. The reports indicate Swell's operational keys for swETH and rswETH, including the oracle bot, were compromised: the tokens' reported backing was raised by up to 1% per hour without corresponding ETH, and four malicious upgrade contracts were deployed. The incident report says about 2,513 ETH across four deposit and withdrawal contracts could be at risk if an upgrade were approved, but no upgrade was queued as of 01:20 UTC on 22 October (Spreek's incident report).
The unbacked NAV increases could let the attacker buy tokens below the falsely raised redemption value, process their own withdrawals at that rate, and block other holders' redemptions; the reported upgrade path could expose the larger contract balances. Security researcher 0xQuit reported that the ProxyAdmins sit behind a seven-day Swell Timelock administered by a 4/7 multisig, and said none of its seven signers had transacted since the attack began (0xQuit's assessment).
Swell said it was investigating with security partners and reported that no ETH had left the swETH or rswETH deposit or withdrawal contracts; its statement said no action was required (Swell's statement). The root cause, including the suggested Railway connection, remains unconfirmed in the reports.